> It's not all roses and we're paying for the freewheeling approach to this day in some cases, cf. email spam and BGP hijacking. But it gave results and provided unstoppable momentum.
Those are hard problems that ITU/OSI did not exactly have solutions for. Literally any thing that can be a target of spam becomes a target of spam soon enough, and fixing that is hard.
As for BGP, the rpki should fix that, though I'm told if I look I'll be sad (so I'm not looking).
> As for BGP, the rpki should fix that, though I'm told if I look I'll be sad (so I'm not looking).
Afaiu, it’s even worse than you might think: RPKI doesn’t actually secure BGP. It provides only origin validation (i.e. which ASes may use which IP blocks). It critically does not provide path validation (i.e. which ASes may provide transit for which other ASes). Which is kind of a big deal.
Those are hard problems that ITU/OSI did not exactly have solutions for. Literally any thing that can be a target of spam becomes a target of spam soon enough, and fixing that is hard.
As for BGP, the rpki should fix that, though I'm told if I look I'll be sad (so I'm not looking).