> With "presumption", I think you may be confusing terms. There's a statutory presumption you get in your favor once you successfully register copyright with the Copyright Office. That's a presumption for a party challenging the validity of a copyright to overcome---say, a defendant in a copyright infringement suit.
There are two different rebuttable presumptions here – one is the statutory rebuttable presumption under the Copyright Act; the other is that Skidmore deference is itself a rebuttable presumption. They are distinct, but in copyright cases, is there a clearcut boundary between them? If you read the 6th Circuit's decision, you will find that they deal with both the statutory presumption issue and the Skidmore/Chevron deference issue in the same section, and treat them as closely related as opposed to clearly separable. Maybe, if you think I'm confusing the two, you might think the Sixth Circuit panel was too?
> Judges and courts don't bear "burdens" under "presumptions".
I think we are using "burden" here in different senses. You are using it in a narrow, technical legal sense, and I agree with you that in that sense, the parties bear "burdens", not the Court.
However, in a broader sense of the term "burden" – in the sense of (informal) logic, philosophy, discourse analysis, etc – lower courts do bear a persuasive burden, of convincing the appellate courts to uphold rather than overturn their decisions, and rebuttable presumptions can work to shape, even increase, that burden.
> The court couldn't ignore the Copyright Office's reasons. But if it weren't persuaded, it could rule otherwise. It would have to read the Copyright Office and grapple with it, but not agree with it. Especially if it heard a better argument in briefing.
The District Court erred by simply engaging in a cursory dismissal of the Copyright Office's interpretive position, as opposed to engaging in a detailed analysis of that position against the Skidmore factors. If it had done that, the 6th Circuit would have found it harder to reverse the District Court's decision, even if it had ultimately arrived at the same result. Of course, if the 6th Circuit really wanted to overturn the decision, it could have (especially given de novo review)–but the District Court could have made the 6th Circuit's work cut out for it, as opposed to giving it easy grounds for a reversal.
You could say the lower court both failed to meet its persuasive burden with respect to the appellate court, and simultaneously failed to impose a greater persuasive burden on the appellate court (in reversing) than it could have. But for both, these are added persuasive burdens which only exist because the rebuttable presumption of Skidmore created them.
There are two different rebuttable presumptions here – one is the statutory rebuttable presumption under the Copyright Act; the other is that Skidmore deference is itself a rebuttable presumption. They are distinct, but in copyright cases, is there a clearcut boundary between them? If you read the 6th Circuit's decision, you will find that they deal with both the statutory presumption issue and the Skidmore/Chevron deference issue in the same section, and treat them as closely related as opposed to clearly separable. Maybe, if you think I'm confusing the two, you might think the Sixth Circuit panel was too?
> Judges and courts don't bear "burdens" under "presumptions".
I think we are using "burden" here in different senses. You are using it in a narrow, technical legal sense, and I agree with you that in that sense, the parties bear "burdens", not the Court.
However, in a broader sense of the term "burden" – in the sense of (informal) logic, philosophy, discourse analysis, etc – lower courts do bear a persuasive burden, of convincing the appellate courts to uphold rather than overturn their decisions, and rebuttable presumptions can work to shape, even increase, that burden.
> The court couldn't ignore the Copyright Office's reasons. But if it weren't persuaded, it could rule otherwise. It would have to read the Copyright Office and grapple with it, but not agree with it. Especially if it heard a better argument in briefing.
The District Court erred by simply engaging in a cursory dismissal of the Copyright Office's interpretive position, as opposed to engaging in a detailed analysis of that position against the Skidmore factors. If it had done that, the 6th Circuit would have found it harder to reverse the District Court's decision, even if it had ultimately arrived at the same result. Of course, if the 6th Circuit really wanted to overturn the decision, it could have (especially given de novo review)–but the District Court could have made the 6th Circuit's work cut out for it, as opposed to giving it easy grounds for a reversal.
You could say the lower court both failed to meet its persuasive burden with respect to the appellate court, and simultaneously failed to impose a greater persuasive burden on the appellate court (in reversing) than it could have. But for both, these are added persuasive burdens which only exist because the rebuttable presumption of Skidmore created them.