> only real security comes from tight vertical integration.
You're not describing security, you're describing theater.
Tight vertical integration doesn't prevent security defects, it makes it harder or impossible for independent researchers to discover, and become known publicly. Pick your favorite TLA, they'll figure it out and tell no one.
Better security actually comes from public scrutiny, at least when the issues are actually fixed by companies.
I am not an expert in this, but as far as I can tell from what I read, Linux doesn’t even try to implement a safe protocol here.
Apple is the only company that enforces a safe pairing that is - to the best of my knowledge - unbroken as of today.
That state of affairs directly contradicts your assertion, at least in this case. Which naturally doesn’t make the opposite unconditionally true, but things seem to be a little more complicated than you assert.
> I am not an expert in this, but as far as I can tell from what I read, Linux doesn’t even try to implement a safe protocol here.
Define safe? Safe meaning someone can take apart the device replace the fingerprint sensor, and return it to you without your knowledge? Have you heard of dma?
You also would never trust this responsibility to the kernel, the hardware itself would need to be responsible for this. A good TPM chip that actively wants to support Linux would be nice.
> Apple is the only company that enforces a safe pairing that is - to the best of my knowledge - unbroken as of today.
lol, that's my whole point though. Apple doesn't publish any information, and actively obstructs free open reverse engineering, it's not going to be found by someone who wants you to know, it will still be found by people who don't want you to know.
> That state of affairs directly contradicts your assertion, at least in this case. Which naturally doesn’t make the opposite unconditionally true, but things seem to be a little more complicated than you assert.
No, you misunderstand my assertion. Perhaps colored by lack of understanding of the threat model here.
If someone is able to separate you from your device and perform any modification to the device hardware itself you've lost no amount of vertical integration is going to save you from that. if they're able to separate you from your device and replace the biometric sensor in a way that's undetectable by you, you lost a long time ago because you leave your fingerprints and face scan everywhere you go.
Attacks on biometric devices while interesting and useful for some threats, are merely interesting theoretical attacks.
Does apples tight integration and obscene control over their biometric devices increase the cost of an attack, and by proxy, the security of the system? yes absolutely. does it do so meaningfully? not even close.
does apples take control over the biometric systems increase the cost and difficulty of a repair? yes absolutely. does apples type integration of biometric systems increase the cost of repair meaningfully such that it is an apples financial interests to do so? Yes, that's the point. For an additional few bucks, Apple gets to claim security and if your screen breaks now you need a whole new iPhone or you pay Apple to replace it for you.
saying tight vertical integration increases security is like saying a $1,000,001 is more than $1,000,000. The added security is effectively a rounding error, until you solve all the other attacks available.
You're not describing security, you're describing theater.
Tight vertical integration doesn't prevent security defects, it makes it harder or impossible for independent researchers to discover, and become known publicly. Pick your favorite TLA, they'll figure it out and tell no one.
Better security actually comes from public scrutiny, at least when the issues are actually fixed by companies.